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Korea and Export-Led Growth
South Korea is a well-known example of a
nation that has followed a development strategy
thatexplicitly promotes exports. It has done so
since the early 1960s with remarkable results.
Average annual real GNP growth in Korea was
9.2 percent between 1962 and 1979, and,
excepting 1980, has averaged over 7 percent in
the 1980s. (The assassination of South Korean
President Park in 1979 threw the country into
turmoil, and real GNP consequently fell more
than 5 percent in 1980). Growth in
manufactures has been substantially higher than
overall GNP growth, and the growth in export
volume has been even more impressive. Export
volume rose more than fourfold in the 1960s,
tenfold in the 1970s, and doubled during the
1980-1985 period.
Despite Korea's impressive growth record, it
remains unclear whether export promotion
policies themselves significantly contributed to
the success. The economic profession still has
not reached a consensus over whether explicit
export promoting polices are preferable to more
neutral (in terms of not favoring one sector over
another) market-oriented liberalization policies.
This Letter explores the South Korean
experience. We conclude that Korea's
development strategy has played an important
role in its impressive growth record. However,
we find evidence that continued reliance on
"export-led" growth and expansion of the
export sector as a share of real output could
soon distort resource allocation to such an
extent as actually to prove a net drag on further
overall economic expansion.
South Korean development policy
The ideology of the "Export First" Policy in
South Korea was established in the first Five-
Year Economic Development Plan (1962-66),
and was clearly documented in the second Plan.
The main policy measures consisted of various
administrative supports for export promotion, a
preferential tax system, and credit subsidies for
export activities. Equally important, export
production activities were set free from the
traditional all-pervasive protectionist import
regime. (Korea continued to restrict materials
imported for production activities oriented to
domestic consumption, however.)
The allocation of credit through the banking
system was a major channel through which the
export sector was given preferential treatment.
First, administrative regulations maintained
below-market interest rates on bank loans, and,
second, those low interest loans were rationed
by various government agencies to preferred
sectors for export expansion.
Some "leakages" from the tightly controlled
banking sector occurred and an unregulated and
unsanctioned kerb market for funds grew as a
consequence. But the net impact of the
administratively determined bias of the banking
sector, given the limited nature of alternative
sources of funds and the general absence of
open money and credit markets, was to direct
resources in the economy toward export-
oriented industries at below-market rates of
interest.
One important aspect of Korean export
promotion policy in its earlier stages,
emphasized by Professor Hong of Seoul
University, is that it was an "open-entry" system
allowing a new group of entrepreneurs not
traditionally engaged in export manufacturing to
take full advantage of the new incentive
structure. Moreover, the Korean bureaucracy
was generally very effective and energetic in
carrying out the export promotion policy.
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) officials, for
example, set annual export targets at the
beginning of each year and used all their
influence to meet these objectives (expediting
the administrative process, strengthening
existing export schemes, and exhorting firms to
accelerate exports).
In the early 1970s, Korea began to move away
from the "open entry" nature of its export
promotion strategy. The government began
enlarging its scope of selecting prospective
industries for special subsidies and increasingly
assigned projects to existing, and successful,
export firms.FRBSF
This growing concentration of export business
activities in the hands of a small number of
select business groups has not gone uncriticized,
however. In fact, rationing of credit in favor of
administratively selected industries and firms
recently has been blamed for causing numerous
distortions in production activity. Moreover,
several well-known failures among the group of
targeted export industries that was heavily
subsidized (nonferrous metal manufacturing,
large petrochemical complexes, large fertilizer
plants, capital-intensive armament factories,
and a gigantic heavy machine factory) generated
general criticism of the policy of administrative
credit controls. Some observers have begun to
argue that the Korean government should start
reducing the "excessiveness" of credit rationing
by enhancing the role ofthe market mechanism
in resource allocation and thereby increase
efficiency in the economy and support growth.
Limits to export-led growth
Chart 1 shows the growth in the share of exports
in total production (GNP) in Korea over the last
two decades. The export sector has grown from
approximately 4 percent of total GNP in 1964 to
almost 40 percent in 1985. Clearly, South
Korea's export promotion policies have been
successful in terms of increasing the share of
exports compared to other sectors in the econ-
omy. More important, itis also likely that
Korea's rapid output expansion, and the policies
favoring the export sector, contributed to output
growth beyond that which would otherwise
have occurred. But even under the best of cir-
cumstances, there are good theoretical reasons
to support the idea of limits to what export-pro-
moting policies can contribute to overall growth.
Large benefits (Le., output growth increases) are
likely to be associated with development of the
export sector when that sector is small in com-
parison to the rest ofthe economy. Greater pro-
ductivity in the export sector and externality
effects (when increasing output in the export
sector leads to a rise in nonexport output even
when the resource commitment in the latter sec-
tor is unchanged) are likely to be most pro-
nounced at early stages of economic
development.
Reasons typically given for the benefits of export
expansion to the nonexport sector include econ-
omies of scale, easing offoreign exchange con-
straints, greater incentives for technological
improvements and adoption of more efficient
management techniques due to foreign competi-
tion. Each of these benefits, however,would
likely decline as the proportion of exports in
total output grows. For example, as export
receipts grow, the foreign exchange constraint
on buying essential imports to the production
process becomes less binding. It is reasonable to
presume that foreign exchange constraints may
have been binding when export receipts in
Korea represented only 4 percent of total GNP.
Foreign exchange constraints are less likely to be
binding when export receipts represent 40 per-
cent of GNP, however.
Simply put, the larger the proportion of
resources devoted to the export sector, the more
likely that a point of diminishing returns will
eventually be reached. In other words, at some
point, continued reliance upon an export-
promoting policy bias is likely to become coun-
terproductive, and a more balanced develop-
ment strategy will be needed to pull the
economy forward.
Evidence of diminishing returns
To shed some light on the issue of the limits to
export-led growth, Nirvikar Singh and I calcu-
lated the combined effects of export sector pro-
ductivity differentials by estimating a production
function for the Korean economy. The produc-
tion function related output growth to growth in
labor and capital inputs as well as benefits asso-
ciated with potential export expansion. In statis-
tical terms, the diminishing returns argument
holds that the contribution to output growth
associated with a rise in exports will likely
decline with growth in the relative size of the
export sector. Following this reasoning, we
allowed the externality and productivity dif-
ferential effects to vary over time as a function of
the ratio ofexports to GNP.
The results, shown in Chart 2, suggest that the
additional contribution to output growth associ-
ated with expansion of the export sector was
very large atthe beginning of the 1960s but has
gradually declined. At the beginning ofthe
period (1964), a one-percent rise in the export!
GNP ratio contributed almost a one-percent rise
in output growth, holding constant total
resources in the economy. In other words, even
after taking into account the contributions toChart 1
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output growth from investment and labor inputs
and trend growth, there remained significant
effects associated with expanding the export sec-
tor. However, these effects are estimated to have
declined with expansion of the export sector
from one percent in 1964 to around two-tenths
of one percent at present. Our research suggests
that a further rise in the relative size of the
export sector would soon drive this additional
export effect to zero.
In short, our research indicates that the funda-
mental economic principle of diminishing
returns also applies to resource commitments
that have favored expansion of the export sector
relative to the nonexport sector in Korea over
the past two decades.
Policy implications
Both economic theory and the results reported
here for South Korea suggest that an export-led
development strategy could prove very effective
during particular stages of industrialization. As
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the economy becomes increasingly open to
world trade, however, and particularly as
exports grow as a share of total production, con-
tined reliance upon an export promotion bias in
policy could prove counterproductive.
South Korea's experience suggests that relying
upon export expansion as a locomotive of eco-
nomic development was good economic policy.
However, the exportshare oftotal output is now
close to 40 percent in South Korea. By both his-
torical and international standards this repre-
sents an enormous proportion of resources
devoted to export production (the share of
exports in total Japanese production,for exam-
ple, is only about 17 percent). At this juncture, it
may well be appropriate for South Korea to turn
to a more balanced, market-oriented develop-
ment strategy. Such a strategy could prove the
impetus to yet another stage of rapid economic
progress.
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Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 209,058 - 168 4,032 1.9
Loans and Leases1 6 184,712 112 585 0.3
Commercial and Industrial 51,250 - 213 403 0.7
Real estate 72,263 172 5,338 7.9
Loans to Individuals 36,883 - 50 - 4,436 - 10.7
Leases 5,420 28 - 129 - 2.3
U.S. Treasury and AgencySecurities2 17,089 - 275 4,037 30.9
Other Securities2 7,258 - 4 - 590 - 7.5
Total Deposits 207,728 - 1,927 - 3,810 - 1.8
Demand Deposits 52,158 - 2,054 - 5,456 - 9.4
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 35,112 - 1,442 - 17,834 - 33.6
OtherTransaction Balances4 20,331 - 178 1,889 10.2
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 135,239 305 - 243 - 0.1
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 44,246 48 - 2,098 - 4.5
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 ormore 31,870 38 - 1,767 - 5.2
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 25,835 - 752 - 882 - 3.3
Two WeekAverages
ofDaily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes U.S. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TI&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change